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STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY UNDER
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A:
"DON'T THROW THE BABY OUT WITH THE
BATHWATER"
Honorable George C. Pratt:
Professor Henderson, I believe, has demonstrated the bewilder-
ing nature of the problems that surround products liability. Our
next speaker is Professor Stuart Madden.
Professor M. Stuart Madden*:
I greatly appreciate the opportunity to speak at this symposium.
My colleagues on this panel include lawyers, teachers and authors
who have shaped, and who will continue to shape, modem prod-
ucts liability law.
I believe that the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 402A1
and its erudite accompanying comments have performed yeo-
* Professor M. Stuart Madden, Charles A. Frueauff Research Professor,
Pace University School of Law; B.A., 1971, University of Pennsylvania;
M.A., 1972, London School of Economics and Political Science; J.D., 1976,
Georgetown University Law Center. Some of his publications include:
PRODUCTS LABmrrr (2d ed. 1988 & Supp. 1993); ToXIC TORTS DESKBOOK
(1992); Issue Preclusion in Products Liability, 11 PACE L. REv. 87 (1990).
1. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORT § 402A (1965) provides in
pertinent part:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to
liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or
consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product,
and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and
sale of his product, and
1
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man's work in leading modem products liability law through its
first thirty years, and have permitted development of broad areas
of consensus as to the types of product risks and injuries that
should import seller liability. 2 As a result, I believe that the cur-
rent initiative of the American Law Institute (A.L.I.) 3 to prepare
a Restatement of products liability should properly assign sub-
stantial deference to the language and structure of such interpre-
tive comments to the current section 402A as have proved suc-
cessful in promoting a rational, progressive, and moderately
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or
entered into any contractual relationship with the seller.
Id.
2. Case law interpretation has not been uniform, however. Compare
Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 446-47 (Cal. 1978) (holding that a
plaintiff with a strict product liability claim need not prove that the product
was "unreasonably dangerous") with Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 525
P.2d 1033, 1036-38 (Or. 1976) (requiring that a product be unreasonably
dangerous for a manufacturer to be strictly liable, stressing that such a test
does not confuse the distinction between strict liability and negligence). See
generally Joseph A. Page, Generic Product Risks: The Case Against Comment
k and For Strict Tort Liability, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 853 (1983). The first
decision to hold manufacturers strictly liable in tort for defective products was
Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1962). Since this
decision, scores of courts have followed the holding enumerated in Greenman
and "codified" by Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A. See, e.g., Kaiser
Aluminum and Chem. Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 981 F.2d 136, 143
(4th Cir. 1992) (noting Greenman as the "promulgation . . . of the modem
doctrine of strict liability in tort. ... "); Westric Battery Co. v. Standard
Elec. Co., 482 F.2d 1307, 1315 (10th Cir. 1973) (stating that "[o]ut of the
Greenman v. Yuba decision emerged § 402A of the Restatement of the Law of
Torts 2d .... ."); Passwaters v. General Motors Corp., 454 F.2d 1270, 1277
(8th Cir. 1972) (recognizing "Justice Traynor's opinion in the Greenman case"
as the foremost authority explicating the doctrine of strict liability).
3. The American Law Institute (A.L.I.) began with the formation of a
committee made up of legal scholars such as Benjamin Cardozo, Arthur
Corbin, Learned Hand, Harlan Stone and John Wigmore. In 1923, this
committee organized the A.L.I. for the purpose of establishing a "Restatement
of the Law" to deal with the rising complexity of American Law. The A.L.I.
adopted § 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts in 1965 and is now in
the process of drafting the Restatement (Third) of Torts. See generally Herbert
F. Goodrich, The Story of the American Law Institute, 1951 WASH. L. REV.
283 (1951).
2
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uniform interpretation of seller liability for harm caused by de-
fective products. 4
In a practical vein, however, I must recognize that there exists
a seeming majority of experts in the field who believe that strict
tort liability is but a chimera that hides de facto negligence
analysis. 5 Thus, in the spirit of compromise and pragmatism, I
gave some thought to whether true strict products liability serves
a more socially beneficial role in some types of product claims
than it does in others. If the answer to that question is yes, it
follows that serious consideration should be given to creating a
residual domain of strict products liability for such claims, while
surrendering its applicability in others.
Regarding the first question: "Are there types of products or
product claims in which strict products liability serves a role in
the satisfaction of agreed upon tort principles?" My consideration
leads me to conclude that the answer is yes, and that those claim
categories can be described in this way: putting aside alcohol, to-
bacco products, prescription pharmaceuticals, medical devices,
4. Cf. James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, A Proposed
Revision of Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 77 CORNELL L.
REv. 1512, 1536 (1992) (proposing that "courts should not review the
adequacy of prescription drug designs ..... ); Kim D. Larsen, Note, Strict
Products Liability and the Risk-Utility Test for Design Defect: An Economic
Analysis, 84 COLuM. L. REv. 2045, 2066-67 (1984) (stating that
manufacturers should not be liable for accidents arising from the use of a
product for which there is no alternative design). But see Keith Miller, Design
Defect Litigation in Iowa: The Myths of Strict Liability, 40 DRAKE L. REv.
465, 469-70 (1991) (stating that due to the limited types of products discussed
in the § 402A comments, "a court that has adopted § 402A can draw little
support from the comments and must develop the meaning of strict liability on
its own.... .").
5. See, e.g., W. Page Keeton, Manufacturer's Liability: The Meaning of
"Defect" in the Manufacture and Design of Products, 20 SYRACUSE L. REv.
559, 563 (1969) (stating that "while strict liability obviates the necessity for
convincing the jury as to the existence of negligence, it does not alter in any
substantial way the plaintiff's proof problems, and the satisfaction of plaintiff's
proof requirements for strict liability will generally result also in a finding of
negligence .... "); John W. Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19
Sw. L.J. 5, 15 (1965) (arguing that since "the test for imposing strict liability
is whether the product was unreasonably dangerous, to use the words of the
Restatement.... is simply a test of negligence....").
19931
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and biological products, a manufacturer should be strictly liable
for defective design or formulation in long latency claims that re-
sult in personal physical injury due to ingestion or inhalation of
the product, other exposure to it, or to radiation emitting from
it. 6
Regarding this category of claims, if one agrees with the
premise that strict products liability serves an irreplaceable role, a
second question may be asked. The second question is whether
there is a theoretical justification, and a practical means, of af-
fording a strict liability standard to such claims, notwithstanding
the probable negligence analysis applied to other claims. It is to
these two questions that I now turn to.
I will try to sketch a preliminary case in which true strict tort
liability can succeed and should not be abandoned to a negligence
standard. This select group of harm categories are harms caused
by nonmedical products that have defective formulations and
6. See McCullock v. H.B. Fuller Co., 981 F.2d 656, 658 (2d Cir. 1992)
(stating whether manufacturer failed to warn the user of an unventilated glue
pot about the fumes is to be determined by the trier of fact "consistent with the
general trend in tort law .... "); Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493
F.2d 1076, 1087 (5th Cir. 1973) (stating that a manufacturer of a defective
product may be held liable on either a tort or warranty theory); Hammond v.
North American Asbestos Corp., 454 N.E.2d 210, 216 (Iil. 1983) (stating that
failure to warn could be a basis for holding manufacturer strictly liable);
Bennett v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 698 S.W.2d 854, 867 (Mo. 1985) (sustaining
plaintiff's claim that defendant corporation should be held strictly liable for
radiation damage resulting from abnormally dangerous activity and remanding
the case to trial court for determination on the question of liability in
accordance with the Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 519 and 520); City of
New York v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, 190 A.D.2d 173, 177, 597 N.Y.S.2d 698,
700 (1st Dep't 1993) (lead based paint manufacturers amenable to trial and
potential joint and several liability on claims arising from the production and
promotion of product which young people could inhale and digest). Courts
have, however, recognized the suggested exception for tobacco, prescription
and alcoholic products. See, e.g., Gunsalus v. Celotex Corp., 674 F. Supp.
1149, 1158-59 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (rejecting strict liability claims based on a
defect theory against cigarette manufacturer); Brown v. Superior Court, 751
P.2d 470, 482-83 (Cal. 1988) (holding that drug manufacturers are not strictly
liable for design defects). Other commentators have expressed similar
suggestions with respect to long latency claims. See generally Barbara Green,
Toxic Torts and Strict Liability, 30 AuG. Hous. LAW. 14 (1992).
[Vol 10
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have been proven to cause injury through exposure, inhalation,
radiation or infection. 7
STRICT LIABILITY, AS APPLIED TO HARM ARISING
FROM CERTAIN PRODUCTS, SERVES IMPORTANT
SOCIETAL OBJECTIVES
The policy justifications for strict products liability have been
stated as relating to: (1) compensation through loss spreading; (2)
deterrence; (3) encouraging useful conduct; (4) amelioration of
expensive and time consuming problems of proof; (5) protection
of consumer expectations; and (6) cost internalization. 8
Modem application of strict products liability has been criti-
cized in many regards. 9 A principal criticism is that due to the
7. There is authority concluding that the application of different liability
rules to different product types violates neither the Equal Protection Clause nor
the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution. See In re Asbestos
Litigation, 829 F.2d 1233, 1244 (3d Cir. 1987) (holding that the denial of
"state-of-the-art" defense to asbestos manufacturers in a products liability
claim does not violate either constitutional clause); Gogol v. Johns-Manville
Sales Corp., 595 F. Supp. 971, 975 (D.N.J. 1984) (stating that since asbestos
cases are like no other products liability cases in terms of their volume,
difficulty, and massive societal problems, denial of this defense does not
violate equal protection).
8. See DAvID A. FISCHER & WILLIAM POWERS, JR., PRODUCTS
LIABILInY: CASES AND MATERIALS 50, 51 (1988); Gary J. Highland, Note,
Sales of Defective Used Products: Should Strict Liability Apply?, 52 S. CAL.
L. REV. 805, 811-19 (1979) (stating that "[tjhe reasons commonly given by
the courts for applying strict liability may be grouped into five broad
categories: enterprise liability, deterrence, risk distribution, practicality, and
implied representation .... ").
9. See, e.g., Teresa M. Schwartz, Product Liability Reform by the
Judiciary, 27 GONZ. L. REv. 303, 306 (1992) (noting that critics of the
products liability system contend that "the system is out of control because of
dramatic increases in the amount of litigation and in the size of damage awards
and because legal standards are too open-ended and unpredictable for
business. ... "); Michael D. Green & Richard A. Matasar, The Supreme
Court and the Products Liability Crisis: Lessons From Boyle's Government
1993] 127
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spare phraseology of "unreasonably dangerous, defective condi-
tion," 10 courts or legislatures in most jurisdictions have expanded
upon the evaluation, by the court or the jury, and thereby have
developed the so called risk-utility criteria. 11 Employment of
Contractor Defense, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 639, 640 n.5 (1990) ("Critics have
argued that the expansion of products liability, along with its concomitant
uncertainty, has driven useful products off the market, stunted incentives for
technological innovation, and harmed the country's ability to compete in the
international marketplace."); Margaret I. Lyle, Note, Mass Tort Claims and
the Corporate Tortfeasor: Bankruptcy Reorganization and Legislative
Compensation Versus the Common-Law Tort System, 61 TEX. L. REv. 1297,
1298 (1983) (commenting that the large awards in products liability cases
"might bankrupt a small corporation, for which the cost of products liability
insurance might become prohibitive" and at the same time "lead to greater
monopolization of manufacturing fields" by large corporations who can afford
such insurance); see generally Frank J. Vandall, "Design Defect" in Products
Liability: Rethinking Negligence and Strict Liability, 43 OHiO ST. L.J. 61
(1982).
10. According to comment g, a product is defective if it leaves the hands
of the manufacturer in a condition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, cmt. g. This has come to be known as the
consumer expectation test. See Mustang Fuel Corp. v. Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co., 411 F. Supp. 705, 706-08 (W.D. Okla. 1976) (holding that a
product was not more dangerous than an ordinary consumer would expect),
rev'd on other grounds, 561 F.2d 202 (10th Cir. 1977). Another test used by
courts is the risk-utility test that imputes knowledge of all risks knowable at
the time of manufacture or sale. See John W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict
Tort Liability For Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 834-35 (1973). A third
approach uses the risk-benefit test but imputes knowledge at the time of trial.
See Keeton, supra note 5, at 569-71. The hybrid approach uses a combination
of the consumer expectation test and the risk-utility test. See Caterpillar
Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 885 (Alaska 1979) (adopting a two prong
test in determining whether product is defective consisting of a consumer
expectation test and/or a risk-utility analysis). But see Pyatt v. Engel Equip.,
Inc., 309 N.E.2d 225, 229 (Ill. App. 1974) (holding that unreasonably
dangerous does not require a definition).
11. See, e.g., Prentis v. Yale Mfg. Co., 365 N.W.2d 176, 183 (Mich.
1984) (applying the risk-utility balancing test and stating that "[tihe competing
factors to be weighed under [such] a ... test invite the trier of fact to consider
the alternatives and risks faced by the manufacturer and to determine whether
in light of these the manufacturer exercised reasonable care in making the
design choices it made. . . ."); Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co.,
406 A.2d 140, 150-51 (N.J. 1979) (noting that it is the court's function to
6
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risk-utility criteria, the argument goes, so pervades strict liability
analysis as to render it indistinguishable from negligence analy-
sis. 12 For this reason, the argument concludes that to continue
describing the liability theory as strict is simply erroneous. 13
On this basis, critics of strict products liability argue that, as
compared to a negligence standard, strict liability adds only
minimally to its stated tort objectives. 14 They sugges, that if the
same objectives of compensation, loss spreading, cost internali-
zation and satisfaction of consumer expectations are achieved
determine whether the manufacturer had a duty to the consumer by "balancing
. . . the nature of the risk, the public interest and the relationship of the
parties... ."), superseded by statute as stated in Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co., 577 A.2d 1239, 1252 (N.J. 1990); Cepeda v. Cumberland
Eng'g Co., 386 A.2d 816, 825 (N.J. 1978) (acknowledging that the risk-
utility analysis is "most useful... for purposes of practical judicial
implementation in design cases...."), overruled by Suter, 406 A.2d at 150-
51, and superseded by statute as stated in Dewey, 577 A.2d at 1252;
Momingstar v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 253 S.E.2d 666, 682-83 (V. Va.
1979) (holding that the risk-utility analysis is useful in products liability cases
"by setting the general contours of relevant expert testimony concerning the
defectiveness of the product .... ").
12. See Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 501 P.2d 1153 (Cal. 1972). In
rejecting the unreasonably dangerous test of § 402A, the Cronin court stated
that the imposition of the unreasonably dangerous test in § 402A "has
burdened the injured plaintiff with proof of an element which rings of
negligence . . . [and] places upon [the plaintiff] a significantly increased
burden and represents a step backward in the area pioneered by this court." Id.
at 1162.
13. Id. ("the Restatement formulation of strict liability rarely leads to a
different conclusion than would have been reached under the laws of
negligence.... ").
14. See Ellen Wertheimer, Unknowable Dangers and the Death of Strict
Products Liability: The Empire Strikes Back, 60 U. CIN. L. REv. 1183 (1992).
The commentator states that "[mI]any courts, when applying strict products
liability, have imputed the knowledge of the product's danger available at the
time of trial to the manufacturer as of the time of the product's manufacture.
Once this knowledge has been imputed, the standard is the same as a
negligence standard." Id. at 1206. She also argues that "[s]ome traces of strict
products liability remain in the form of altered burdens of proof... [but]
[t]hese traces . . . are insufficient to fulfill the goals that strict products
liability was designed to serve." Id. at 1191.
19931
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through application of negligence liability, 15 strict tort liability
adds little but verbiage to the administration of civil justice for
harms caused by unreasonably dangerous products. 16
I will try to respond to these criticisms in turn.
Employment of Risk Utility Criteria Does Not Vitiate Strict Liabil-
ity
Employed appropriately, use of risk-utility evaluation does not
trammel the concept of liability without regard to fault. 17 By
proper employment, I mean that risk-utility evaluation should re-
tain a role in the court's threshold determination of whether or
not the plaintiff has succeeded in presenting evidence that defen-
dant marketed its product in an unreasonably dangerous and de-
fective condition. 18 Where plaintiff has done so, the court should
permit jury evaluation of plaintiff's claim as to whether the prod-
15. See Wertheimer, supra note 14, at 1206.
16. Other writers would agree with this view. See, e.g., Irene W.
Bruynes, Strict Liability and the Admissibility of Evidence of Subsequent
Remedial Measures Under Evidence Rule 407, 5 ALASKA L. REV. 333, 347-50
(1988) (arguing that the theory of strict liability is a misnomer in products
liability cases as unreasonably dangerous standard is closer to negligence);
Joseph A. Page, Deforming Tort Reform, 78 GEo. L.J. 649, 663-69 (1990)
(reviewing PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS
CONSEQUENCES (1988)) (arguing that "strict liability" only applies to
defective products where a negligence-type standard is used to determine if the
product is unreasonably dangerous).
17. Commentators are generally not comfortable with the idea of liability
without fault. See David P. Griffith, Note, Products Liability - Negligence
Presumed: An Evolution, 67 TEx. L. REV. 851, 899 (1989) (arguing that a
fault based standard should be used in every tort case).
18. See Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., The Louisiana Products Liability Act:
Making Sense of It All, 49 LA. L. REV. 629, 668 (1989) ("First the judge must
engage in a balancing process to determine if the plaintiff has established a
prima facie case. If the plaintiff has, then the jury must determine whether, in
its common-sense opinion, the product design in question is unreasonably
dangerous.").
8
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uct was dangerously defective, without reference to risk-utility
balancing. 19
The key distinction between strict tort liability and negligence
analysis has always been that, in negligence analysis, the focus is
on the care exercised by defendant, while in strict tort liability,
the issue is the safety of the product. 20 An influential device for
appreciating and preserving this distinction has been to imagine
that in strict tort liability, knowledge of product risks is imputed
to a defendant without regard to whether the defendant actually
knew or should have known of the risks. 2 1 The Oregon Supreme
Court, in Phillips v. Kimwood Machine Co.,22 explained that the
"imputation" of knowledge operates in this way:
A dangerously defective article would be one which a reasonable
person would not put into the stream of commerce if he had
knowledge of its harmfid character. The test, therefore, is
whether the seller would be negligent if he sold the article
knowing of the risk involved. Strict liability imposes what
amounts to constructive knowledge of the condition of the prod-
uct.2 3
In other words, "[t]he [product] can have a degree of dangerous-
ness which the law of strict liability will not tolerate even though
19. See Galligan, supra note 18, at 669 ("Presuming knowledge of the
plaintiff's proposed design focuses the jury's evaluation on whether the
manufacturer's design was 'reasonably' safe.").
20. See, e.g., Spieker v. Westgo, Inc., 479 N.W.2d 837, 841-42 (N.D.
1992) (explaining that negligence instruction properly informed the jury as to
the difference between negligence and strict liability); Mauch v. Manufacturers
Sales & Serv., Inc., 345 N.W.2d 338, 346-47 (N.D. 1984) (noting that
contributory negligence is not a defense in products liability action); Brown v.
Yamaha Motor Corp., 691 P.2d 577, 579-80 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984) (stating
that rejection of strict liability theory does not foreclose a finding of
negligence).
21. See, e.g., Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 447 A.2d 539,
544 (N.J. 1982) (stating that unknowable risks do not relieve defendants of
liability of the failure to warn); Freund v. Cellofilm Properties, Inc., 432 A.2d
925, 942-43 (N.J. 1981) (stating that a products liability charge in an
inadequate warning case must make clear that knowledge of product risks are
imputed to the manufacturer).
22. 525 P.2d 1033 (Or. 1974).
23. Id. at 1036 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
1993]
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the actions of the designer were entirely reasonable, in view of
what he knew at the time he planned and sold the manufactured
article. "2 4
The critical question unresolved by these statements is what
knowledge shall be imputed to the defendant? Should it be the
knowledge of product risks known or knowable at the time of
original marketing or, should knowledge of product risks known
at the time of trial be imputed to defendant, without regard to
whether such risks were within the spectrum of scientific knowl-
edge at the time of marketing? The dispute is practically as old as
section 402A itself.25 Those taking the view that imputation ap-
plies only to risks knowable at the time of sale adopt a negligence
standard, as advanced by Dean John Wade. 26 Those maintaining
that true strict liability requires imputation of even later revealed
knowledge find support in the argument of Page Keeton, 2 7 to
wit, that as a consequence of assuming the defendant's
knowledge of the dangers of the product, it is irrelevant whether
the existence of such dangers was scientifically discoverable. 2 8
24. Roach v. Kononen, 525 P.2d 125, 129 (Or. 1974) (stating that this
"requisite degree" of knowledge can be defined as a "greater degree of danger
than a consumer has a right to expect.. .. ").
25. Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'g Co., 386 A.2d 816, 825-26 (N.J. 1978)
(foreseeability of dangerousness is imputed to the manufacturer), overruled by
Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 406 A.2d 140, 150-51 (N.J.
1979), and superseded by statute as stated in Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
Co., 577 A.2d 1239, 1252 (N.J. 1990); Johnson v. Clark Equip. Co., 547
P.2d 132, 142 n. 12 (Or. 1976) (stating that danger is assumed to be
foreseeable by the manufacturer in the law of strict products liability),
superseded by statute as stated in Sandford v. Chevrolet Div. of Gen. Motors,
642 P.2d 624, 627 (Or. 1982); Phillips, 525 P.2d at 1040 n. 17 (stating that
the law of strict products liability imputes the knowledge of risks to
manufacturer regardless of whether manufacturer actually knows or not).
26. See Wade, supra note 10, at 834-35; see also Beshada, 447 A.2d at
544 (finding liability for failure to warn of risks which were unknowable).
27. See Keeton, supra note 5, at 569-71; see, e.g., Dart v. Wiebe Mfg.,
Inc., 709 P.2d 876, 881 (Ariz. 1985) (limiting liability to risks which are
known amounts to a standard of negligence); Byrns v. Riddell, Inc., 550 P.2d
1065, 1068 (Ariz. 1976) (test of unreasonable danger imputes knowledge of
risks to the manufacturer).
28. As another court observed, "[t]he Wade and Keeton formulations of
the standard appear to be identical except that Keeton would impute the
10
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It is worth remembering that whether the doctrine is negli-
gence, strict products liability or liability for abnormally danger-
ous activities, the task is always the same: the evaluation of the
utility of a product or a process and the risks inherent in its
use.29 As the Oregon Supreme Court has stated, "The difference
between the three theories of recovery is in the manner in which
the decisional functions are distributed between the court and the
jury." 30 Specifically, in strict products liability, it is the court,
not the jury, that must conduct a risk-utility analysis to determine
whether the product was marketed in an unreasonably dangerous
and defective condition. 3 1
What is proposed is not absolute liability.32 Absolute liability
attaches where a defendant is liable in money damages for any
knowledge of dangers at time of trial to the manufacturer, while Wade would
impute only the knowledge existing at the time the product was sold."
Phillips, 525 P.2d at 1036 n.6. See also Freund v. Cellofilm Properties, Inc.,
432 A.2d 925 (N.J. 1981). In Freund, the New Jersey Supreme Court
explained that the difference between negligence and strict liability in a failure
to warn case is that in strict liability cases knowledge of the dangerousness of
the product is imputed to defendants. Id. at 929-31. As the only issue was
whether the product distributed by defendant was reasonably safe, plaintiff did
not need to prove that defendant knew or should have known of its
dangerousness. ld.
29. See, e.g., McWilliams v. Yamaha Motor Corp., 987 F.2d 200, 205
(3d Cir. 1993) (requiring the application of a risk-benefit analysis as provided
by exception to New Jersey's "open and obvious" danger defense to design
defect claims); O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 463 A.2d 298, 304-06 (N.J. 1983)
(discussing the use of the risk utility test), superseded by statute as stated in
Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 577 A.2d 1239, 1252 (N.J. 1990).
30. Phillips, 525 P.2d at 1039.
31. See, e.g., Motter v. Everest & Jennings, Inc., 883 F.2d 1223, 1227
(3d Cir. 1989) (stating that the trial judge must "evaluate the risks of the
product" and its utility to determine if the case should be submitted to the jury
on the issue of defect); O'Brien, 463 A.2d at 310 (Schreiber, J., concurring &
dissenting) (stating that jury not cognizant of absolute liability elements
causing decisions to reflect value judgments and lack precedential effect); see
also Wade, supra note 10, at 838-41. Cf. Dominick Vetri, Products Liability:
The Developing Framework for Analysis, 54 OR. L. REV. 293, 304 (1975)
(taking the view that the jury should be instructed on the risk-utility factors).
32. See Richard W. Wright, Causation In Tort Lmv, 73 CAL. L. REv.
1735, 1750-51 (1985) (noting that "traditionally, absolute liability has meant
prima facie liability based merely on causation of harm to another.... ").
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harm proximately caused by a design or manufacturing defect in
the product. 33 Strict products liability differs. It is not absolute.
As summarized by the Oregon Supreme Court:
The manner of injury might be so fortuitous and the chances of
injury occurring so remote that it is reasonable to sell the prod-
uct despite the danger. In design cases the utility of the article
may be so great, and the change of design necessary to alleviate
the danger in question may so impair such utility, that it is rea-
sonable to market the product as it is, even though the possibility
of injury exists and was realized at the time of the sale
.... Such an article is not dangerously defective despite its
having inflicted injury. 34
The proof that risk-utility analysis, through imputation of
knowledge to the defendant, is compatible with strict products li-
ability is, as the expression goes, in the pudding. In the work of
lawyers, the pudding is the decisional law. The courts in numer-
ous jurisdictions, which are unequivocally committed to strict tort
liability, nevertheless employ risk-utility analysis to permit
meaningful evaluation of whether a product is safe. 35
33. See, e.g., Galbreath v. Engineering Constr. Corp., 273 N.E.2d 121,
124 (Ind. Ct. App. 1971) (holding that absolute liability is imposed where
damage or injury is proximately caused by the use of explosives whether or not
such damage or injury is immediate or direct); Ohler v. Davis, 298 A.2d 895,
901 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1972) (Cercone, J., dissenting) (stating that absolute
liability applies only if the defect was a proximate cause of the injury).
34. Phillips, 525 P.2d at 1038.
35. See, e.g., Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 454-55 (Cal.
1978) (holding that the design of a product may be determined to be defective
if "the jury finds that the risk of danger inherent in the challenged design
outweighs the benefits of such design .... ") (citation omitted); Roach v.
Kononen, 525 P.2d 125 (Or. 1974). In Roach, the court used the following
seven factors to make a utility/risk determination with respect to the product:
(1) The usefulness and desirability of the product - its utility to the user
and to the public as a whole.
(2) The safety aspects of the product - the likelihood that it will cause
injury, and the probable seriousness of the injury.
(3) The availability of a substitute product which would meet the same
need and not be unsafe.
[Vol 10
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The compatibility of risk-utility criteria with genuine strict
products liability is most clear in jurisdictions where the court
makes a threshold determination of whether or not the plaintiff
has made a jury submissible case that a product is dangerously
defective. 36 In these settings, the risk-utility factors, stated by
Dean John Wade37 and others, are not the basis for instructions
to the jury, but are utilized by the court to determine whether the
a sufficient case has been made out that may be submitted to the
jury. 3 8 If such a case has been made out, then it is submitted to
the jury for its determination as to what constitutes a
"dangerously defective" product. 39
Strict Tort Liability Materially Serves Accepted Tort Policy
Objectives
As mentioned, a central argument against retention of strict
products liability is that, as compared to a negligence standard, it
adds only minimally to the stated policy objectives of compensa-
tion, loss spreading, deterrence, cost internalization and satisfac-
tion of consumer expectations. 4°
(4) The manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe character of the
product without impairing its usefulness or making it too
expensive to maintain its utility.
(5) The user's ability to avoid danger by the exercise of care in the use
of the product.
(6) The user's anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent in the
product and their avoidability, because of the general public
knowledge of the obvious condition of the product, or the
existence of suitable warnings or instructions.
(7) The feasibility, on the part of the manufacturer, of spreading the loss
by setting the price of the product or carrying liability insurance.
Id. at 128-29 (quoting Wade, supra note 10, at 837-38).
36. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
37. See supra note 10, at 837-38.
38. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
39. See Phillips, 525 P.2d at 1040.
40. See generally Stephen D. Sugarman, Alternative Compensation
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Distinguished commentators have suggested that strict tort li-
ability does not induce safer conduct on the part of the actor. 41 In
response, I will invite attention to certain products cases, and to
the decisions and commentary involving the related strict tort
doctrine that apply strict products liability to abnormally danger-
ous activities. 42 While the majority of decisions rejects the appli-
cation of strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities, 43
many of the clearest statements describing the distinctive policy
attributes of true strict liability have been made in such cases. 44
41. Sugarman, supra note 40, at 588 (citing G. Eads & P. Reuter,
Designing Safer Products: Corporate Responses to Product Liability, LAW
AND REGULATION 46 (1983)); see also Kurt M. Zitzer, Illinois Rejects Market
Share Liability: A Policy Based Analysis of Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co., 79 KY.
L.J. 617, 649 (1991) (stating that market share liability theory does not
promote safer conduct).
42. See, e.g., Chavez v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 413 F. Supp. 1203,
1214 (E.D. Cal. 1976) (finding that transportation of explosives is an
ultrahazardous activity, subjecting the carrier to strict liability for resulting
damages); M. W. Worley Constr. Co., v. Hungerford, Inc., 210 S.E.2d 161,
164 (Va. 1974) (ruling that strict liability applies for direct damages caused by
blasting due to its intrinsically dangerous nature provided that the injured party
who had reason to know of the risk did not participate in injurious incident);
Siegler v. Kuhlman, 502 P.2d 1181, 1184 (Wash. 1972) (holding that
transportation of gasoline as freight along public highways to be an abnormally
dangerous activity requiring imposition of strict liability for harm); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 519, 520 (1977). See generally
Virginia E. Nolan & Edmund Ursin, The Revitalization of Hazardous Activity
Strict Liability, 65 N.C. L. REv. 257 (1987) (tracing the origins of the
application of strict liability to abnormally dangerous activities and
commenting on the current status of such liability).
43. See generally M. STUART MADDEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY §§ 11.2 &
11.3 (2d ed. 1988 & Supp. 1993) (analyzing authority).
44. See, e.g., Indiana Harbor Belt R.R. v. American Cyanamid Co., 916
F.2d 1174 (7th Cir. 1990). In Indiana Harbor Belt R.R., the court held that
strict liability imposed for ultrahazardous activity was inapplicable in the
situation where leakage of a toxic and flammable chemical led to suit against
chemical manufacturers, since the accident was due to carelessness and would
be adequately deterred by the threat of liability for negligence. Id. at 1179. See
also City of Bloomington v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 891 F.2d 611, 617
(7th Cir. 1989) (holding that corporation was not strictly liable under
abnormally dangerous activity doctrine to Bloomington for damages due to
ground water contamination, since the damage was due to the activity of third
136 [Vol 10
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Representative of the observations that strict products liability
for abnormally dangerous activities does not clearly serve to im-
prove conduct or to deter actors are the comments of Professors
Henderson and Pearson45 referring to Atlas Chemical Co. v.
Anderson.46 Therein, the Texas Court of Civil Appeals reviewed
a judgment for the plaintiff in a case involving the deliberate
dumping by the defendant of industrial waste on sixty acres of the
plaintiff's land.47 The court affirmed the judgment for the plain-
tiff, concluding that strict liability would attach, under Texas
law, when pollutants are intentionally discharged. 48 The court
explained that "[t]he costs of injuries resulting from pollution
must be internalized by industry as a cost of production and
borne by consumers or shareholders, or both, and not by the in-
jured individual." 4 9
To the Texas Appellate Court's conclusion, Professors Hender-
son and Pearson replied:
[I]t should be clear that, in theory at least, moving from negli-
gence to strict liability will not cause actors to act any more
carefully. In theory, an actor such as Atlas Chemical Industries,
Inc., will invest a socially optimal amount in pollution control
under a regime of negligence-based liability. The losses that
continue to occur even after such optimal investment-the
"residual" pollution losses not deemed worth it to prevent
through precautions because they amount to less than the costs of
prevention-fall on the victims under a negligence rule. But even
if the actor were held strictly liable for all pollution losses, in-
cluding the residual losses that are cheaper to incur than to pre-
party); Sprankle v. Bower Ammonia & Chem. Co., 824 F.2d 409, 415-16 (5th
Cir. 1987) (applying factors from Restatement (Second) of Torts § 520 the
court determined that storage of anhydrous ammonia was not an abnormally
dangerous activity).
45. JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR. & RICHARD N. PEARSON, THE TORTS
PROCEss 695-96 (Little, Brown & Co., 3d ed. 1988).
46. 514 S.W.2d 309 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974), aff'd, 524 S.W.2d 681 (Tex.
1975).
47. Id. at 311.
48. Id. at 313. The court determined that neither "malicious nor wanton
conduct" were required in intentional discharge cases. Id.
49. Id. at 316.
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vent, the actor would not invest more in care than he would if li-
able only when proven negligent because the residual losses are,
by hypothesis, cheaper to incur than to prevent .... [E]ven un-
der strict liability, the actor will find it cheaper to pay for the
residual losses (through insurance, perhaps) than to pay to pre-
vent them. 50
To this critique, I would only set forth what I believe to be the
telling counter-argument, as it has been expressed by various
writers. 51 The authors of the A.L.I.'s 1991 study, entitled Enter-
prise Responsibility for Personal Injury52 suggested that, in the
context of environmental harms, "strict liability may have deter-
rent effects superior to those produced by a negligence standard
when the risk created by an activity is difficult to quantify but
nonetheless substantial." 53 Other authors and judges seemingly
concede that strict liability does affect conduct in ways not
reached by conventional negligence analysis. 54 The point was
50. HENDERSON & PEARSON, supra note 45, at 695-96. See also Steven L.
Humphreys, Comment, An Enemy of the People: Prosecuting the Corporate
Polluter as a Common Law Criminal, 39 AM. U. L. REv. 311, 323-24 (1990).
51. See, e.g., Kathleen B. Benesh, Restitution for the Nonsmoker: Holding
the Tobacco Industry Liable for Injuries to Nonsmokers, 7 IN PUB. INTEREST
12, 15 (1987) (suggesting that the application of strict liability under theory of
product liability or abnormally dangerous activity will act as deterrent to the
harm that the tobacco industry inflicts on the nonsmoker); John A. Chanin,
Comment, Lust on Your Corner: Strict Liability, Victim Compensation, and
Leaking Underground Storage Tanks, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 365, 394 (1991)
(recommending the imposition of strict liability upon manufacturers and users
of leaking underground gasoline storage tanks in order to provide incentives
for such manufacturers and users to remedy their activities and improve their
products).
52. A.L.I., REPORTERS' STUDY, ENTERPRISE LIABILITY FOR PERSONAL
INJURY, Vol. II, Approaches to Legal and Institutional Change (1991).
53. Id. at 366 (citations omitted).
54. See, e.g., Indiana harbor belt R.R.. v. American Cyanamid Co., 916
F.2d 1174, 1177 (7th Cir. 1990) (stating that imposition of strict liability
would give manufacturers an incentive to experiment with different methods to
prevent accidents); see also Guido Calabresi, Optimal Deterrence and
Accidents: To Fleming James, Jr., 84 YALE L.J. 656, 666-70 (1975).
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made by Seventh Circuit Judge and influential law and economics
scholar Judge Richard Posner. 55 In Judge Posner's words:
By making the actor strictly liable ... we give him an incentive,
missing in a negligence regime, to experiment with methods of
preventing accidents that involve not greater exertions of care,
assumed to be futile, but instead relocating, changing, or reduc-
ing (perhaps to the vanishing point) the activity giving rise to the
accident ... . The greater the risk of an accident.., and the
costs of an accident if one occurs... the more we want the ac-
tor to consider the possibility of making accident-reducing activ-
ity changes; the stronger, therefore, is the case for strict liabil-
ity .... 56
In my view, the corrective justice sentiments, permeating the
logic of strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities, are
equally applicable to my suggestion of defective design or formu-
lation and strict products liability for long latency injuries, caused
by toxic exposure by respiration, ingestion, dermal contact and
radiation. It is in these particular injury categories that non-recip-
rocal risks, created by the manufacturer and endured by the
plaintiff, are most stark. It is also in these categories that over a
period of time and after the introduction of hundreds of poten-
tially injurious toxic products and processes, that the episodic
revelation of widespread personal physical injury is seemingly
unavoidable. And it is there that failure to provide a true strict
products liability remedy has, and will, operate most harshly.
A Proposal for a Residual Domain of Strict Liability for
Personal Physical Injury Sustained by Radiation, Inhala-
tion or Absorption
Revealed risks at the time of initial research, development and
first marketing, were not known and were truly not knowable,
55. Richard A. Posner, Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit.
56. Indiana Harbor Belt R.R.., 916 F.2d at 1177 (citation omitted).
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are rare indeed. 57 Where they happen, and where they affect
broad population segments, the injuries are most often related to
toxic products or processes. 5 8 A noteworthy example of a toxic
exposure products liability case, in which the plaintiff prevailed
even though the court accepted the hypothesis that the risks of
exposure were not known at the time of marketing, is the asbes-
tos injury decision in Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products
Corp.,59 decided by the Supreme Court of New Jersey in 1982.60
We all recognize that Beshada has gained its notoriety in equal
parts from, both, the vision of its holding, and the flat rejection
of that vision by most jurisdictions. 61 Even in its state of origin,
the New Jersey Supreme Court later limited Beshada to its asbes-
tos antecedents. 62 Please try to think of Beshada in the context of
its logic. This is the finite subject areas, for which I propose, that
retain true strict torts liability and include products that, after a
period of latency, are toxic when touched, ingested, inhaled or by
57. Some of the instances where courts found that the risks were not
known or knowable at the time of marketing have been in prescription drug
cases. In such cases, some courts have refused to find strict liability on the part
of the manufacturer. See, e.g., Basko v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 F.2d 417,
426 (2d Cir. 1969) (refusing to find the manufacturer of prescription drug
Aralen strictly liable where risks were not apparent at time of manufacture);
Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 481 (Cal. 1988) (holding that
manufacturers of prescription pharmaceuticals could only be liable for failure
to warn of side effects that were known or knowable at the time of
distribution).
58. See Griffin v. Planter's Chem. Corp., 302 F. Supp. 937, 943-44
(D.S.C. 1969) (holding manufacturer liable for marketing a pesticide with
unknown toxic capabilities); Orr v. Shell Oil Co., 177 S.W.2d 608, 612 (Mo.
1943) (holding defendant liable for supplying chemical, with questionable
toxic capability, which led laborer to develop severe rash).
59. 447 A.2d 539 (N.J. 1982).
60. The Opinion of the Court was delivered by Judge Pashman.
61. See generally Andrew T. Berry, Beshada v. Johns-Manville Corp.:
Revolution - Or Aberration - In Products Liability Law, 52 FORDHAM L. REV.
786, 800 (1984) (noting that the first state supreme court to consider Beshada
rejected the decision in Heath v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 464 A.2d 288 (N.H.
1983)).
62. See generally Landrigan v. Celotex Corp., 605 A.2d 1079, 1099 (N.J.
1992) (discussing the limitation of the Beshada doctrine in New Jersey).
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radiation cause personal physical injury, excluding alcohol, to-
bacco and prescriptive products. 63
Beshada involved failure to warn claims brought by plaintiffs,
some of whom were exposed to defendants' asbestos products as
early as the 1930's.64 Defendants claimed that any duty to warn
attached only after the risks to the worker (as distinct from previ-
ously known risks associated with high concentration exposure in
asbestos textile mills) became scientifically knowable.65 The New
Jersey Supreme Court rejected this "state-of-the-art" or "state of
scientific knowability" limitation on a defendants' informational
duty, and held that even accepting defendant's claims of justifi-
able ignorance, liability for failure to warn would attach without
regard to when the risks became scientifically knowable.66
The court proceeded to explain why only imposition of true
strict tort liability could satisfy important goals of compensation,
deterrence and judicial efficiency: 67
Risk Spreading. One of the most important arguments generally
advanced for imposing strict liability is that the manufacturers
and distributors of defective products can best allocate the costs
of the injuries resulting from those products. The premise is that
the price of a product should reflect all of its costs, including the
cost of injuries caused by the product. This can best be accom-
plished by imposing liability on the manufacturer and distribu-
tors. Those persons can insure against liability and incorporate
the cost of the insurance in the price of the product. In this way,
the costs of the product will be borne by those who profit from
it: the manufacturers and distributors who profit from its sale
63. Cf. James A. Henderson, Jr. & Theodore Eisenberg, The Quiet
Revolution in Products Liability: An Empirical Study of Legal Change, 37
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 479 (1990) (stating that in the 1980's plaintiffs stormed
barriers in areas such as handguns, cigarettes and alcoholic beverages
attempting to recover on strict liability theory).
64. Beshada, 447 A.2d at 542.
65. Id. at 542-43.
66. Id. at 546.
67. Id. at 547-49. "The most important inquiry.., is whether imposition
of liability for failure to warn of dangers which were undiscoverable at the
time of manufacture will advance the goals and policies sought to be achieved
by our strict liability rules. We believe that it will." Id. at 547.
1993]
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and the buyers who profit from its use. It should be a cost of
doing business that in the course of doing that business an unrea-
sonable risk was created. 68
The court conceded that there was "some truth" to the defen-
dants' claim that the stated policies of risk spreading and cost in-
ternalization were not advanced by true strict liability. 69 Defen-
dants had argued that since unknowable hazards "by definition
are not predicted, the price of the hazardous product will not be
adjusted to reflect the costs of the injuries it will produce." 70
Nonetheless, the court stated:
[T]he same argument can be made as to hazards which are
deemed scientifically knowable but of which the manufacturers
are unaware. Yet it is well established under our tort law that
strict liability is imposed even for defects which were unknown
to the manufacturer. It is precisely the imputation of knowledge
to the defendant that distinguishes strict liability from negli-
gence.71
A second policy justification for true strict liability, the New
Jersey Supreme Court stated, is found in enhanced accident
avoidance. 72 In citing New Jersey precedent that strict liability
68. Id. at 547.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. (citation omitted) The court continued:
Defendants advance no argument as to why risk spreading works better
for unknown risks than for unknowable risks. Second, spreading the
costs of injuries among all those who produce, distribute and purchase
manufactured products is far preferable to imposing it on the innocent
victims who suffer illnesses and disability from defective products. This
basic normative premise is at the center of our strict liability rules. It is
unchanged by the state of scientific knowledge at the time of
manufacture. Finally, contrary to defendants' assertion, this rule will
not cause the price and production level of manufactured products to
diverge from the so-called economically efficient level. Rather, the rule
will force the price of any particular product to reflect the cost of
insuring against the possibility that the product will turn out to be
defective.
Id.
72. Id. at 547-48.
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"is but an attempt to minimize the costs of accidents and to
consider who should bear those costs[,]" the court noted the
celebrated article by Calabresi & Hirschoff. 73 The article
suggests that "the strict liability issue is to decide which party is
the 'cheapest cost avoider,' or who is in the best position to make
the cost-benefit analysis between accident costs and accident
avoidance costs and to act on that decision once it is made." 74
Using this approach, the court noted that "it [was] obvious that
the manufacturer rather than the factory employee is 'in the better
position both to judge whether avoidance costs would exceed
foreseeable accident costs and to act on that judgment.'" 75
To defendants' argument that the logic of "cheapest cost avoi-
der... has no force as to hazards which by definition were un-
discoverable[,]" 76 the court rejoined:
Defendants have treated the level of technological knowledge at
a given time as an independent variable not affected by defen-
dants' conduct. But this view ignores the important role of
industry in product safety research. The "state-of-the-art" at a
given time is partly determined by how much industry invests in
safety research. By imposing on manufacturers the costs of fail-
ure to discover hazards, we create an incentive for them to invest
more actively in safety research. 77
Continuing, the New Jersey Supreme Court, in Beshada, stated
that true strict products liability would work economies in the
fact-finding process by avoiding laborious mini-trials on the is-
sues of what the manufacturer knew and when the manufacturer
learned of it.78 In the court's words:
Fact finding process. The analysis thus far has assumed that it is
possible to define what constitutes "undiscoverable" knowledge
and that it will be reasonably possible to determine what knowl-
edge was technologically discoverable at a given time. In fact,
73. Id. at 548 (citing Guido Calabresi & John T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test
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both assumptions are highly questionable. The vast confusion
that is virtually certain to arise from any attempt to deal in a trial
setting with the concept of scientific knowability constitutes a
strong reason for avoiding the concept altogether by striking the
state-of-the-art defense. 79
Furthermore, the court elucidated:
Scientific knowability, as we understand it, refers not to what in
fact was known at the time, but to what could have been known
at the time. Proof of what could have been known will inevitably
be complicated, costly, confusing and time-consuming. Each side
will have to produce experts in the history of science and tech-
nology to speculate as to what knowledge was feasible in a given
year. We doubt that juries will be capable of even understanding
the concept of scientific knowability, much less be able to re-
solve such a complex issue . . . The concept of knowability is
complicated further by the fact, noted above, that the level of in-
vestment in safety research by manufacturers is one determinant
of the state-of-the-art at any given time. Fairness suggests that
manufacturers not be excused from liability because their prior
inadequate investment in safety rendered the hazards of their
product unknowable.so
79. Id.
80. Id. Furthermore, the Beshada court continued:
[D]iscussion of state-of-the-art could easily confuse juries into believing
that blameworthiness is at issue. Juries might mistakenly translate the
confused concept of state-of-the-art into the simple question of whether
it was defendants' fault that they did not know of the hazards of
asbestos. But that would be negligence, not strict liability.
Id. at 548.
For precisely this reason, Professor Keeton has urged that negligence concepts
be carefully avoided in strict liability cases:
My principal thesis is, and has been, that theories of negligence should
be avoided altogether in the products liability area in order to simplify
the law, and that if the sale of a product is made under circumstances
that would subject someone to an unreasonable risk in fact, liability for
harm resulting from those risks should follow.
W. Page Keeton, Products Liability - Inadequacy of Information, 48 TEX. L.
REV. 398, 409 (1970) (footnote omitted).
As explained in § 402A, comment j, a seller has responsibility to inform users
of dangers which the seller knows or should have known at the time of sale.
144 [Vol 10
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Apart from the New Jersey experience with Beshada, has any
other state court interpreted its products liability law to effect a
"hindsight" standard? If there is such a state, how has it oper-
ated? Washington has such a statute. The Revised Code of
Washington section 7.72.030(1)81 provides that "[a] product
manufacturer is subject to liability to a claimant if the claimant's
harm was proximately caused by the negligence of the manufac-
turer in that the product was not reasonably safe as designed or
not reasonably safe because adequate warnings or instructions
were not provided." 82
Two additional provisions of the Washington statute illuminate
what is meant by the phrase "not reasonably safe." Revised Code
of Washington section 7.72.030(1)(b) ("subsection (b)") states:
A product is not reasonably safe because adequate warnings or
instructions were not provided with the product, if, at the time
of manufacture, the likelihood that the product would cause the
claimant's harm or similar harms, and the seriousness of those
harms, rendered the warnings or instructions of the manufacturer
inadequate and the manufacturer could have provided the warn-
ings or instructions which the claimant alleges would have been
adequate. 8 3
This statute was applied by the Washington Supreme Court in
Ayers v. Johnson & Johnson Baby Products, Co.,84 a suit
brought by the parents of a child who ingested the manufacturer's
popular baby oil, leading ultimately to cardiac arrest and to brain
RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. j. Other commentators are in
seeming agreement with the court that such proof would be complicated. See,
e.g., Kenneth S. Abraham, Individual Action and Collective Responsibility:
The Dilemma of Mass Tort Reform, 73 VA. L. REv. 845, 856 (1987) ("Such
proof would be enormously complicated, expensive, and difficult."). With
respect to state-of-the-art evidence, see Anderson v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass
Corp., 810 P.2d 549, 559 (Cal. 1991) (explaining that the state-of-the-art
evidence is evidence that the risk was neither known nor knowable at the time
of sale).
81. WASH. REv. CODE § 7.72.030(1) (1988).
82. Id.
83. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.72.030(1)(b) (1988).
84. 818 P.2d 1337 (Wash. App. 1991).
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damage. 85 Before the court was the reversal of a trial judgment
notwithstanding the verdict following a $2.5 million jury award
against Johnson & Johnson on the theory that it failed to provide
adequate warnings that this product, intended for use around in-
fants, could cause serious injury or death if ingested by a child. 86
In ruling against the trial court, the court of appeals held that
foreseeability was not an element of a failure to warn claim under
subsection (b).87
Affirming the court of appeals' holding that foreseeability is
not an element of a failure to warn claim, the Washington Su-
preme Court stated that the design defect provision, Washington
precedent, and the legislative history of the Washington Products
Liability Act, required it to apply strict liability to design
claims. 88 Avoiding the risk identified earlier by our colleague,
John Vargo, 89 that many states permit a negligence-like analysis
for design claims to contaminate analysis of warnings liability, 90
the Washington Supreme Court held that the statute's warnings
provision was also one of strict liability. 91 This was true, the
court continued, even though the statute provided a negligence-
like balancing test for both warnings and design claims. 92 The
balancing of the warnings claim, indistinguishable from that for
design claims, could be stated as:
[O]n one side of the balance... are the likelihood that the
product would cause plaintiff's harms or similar harms and the
seriousness of those harms. On the other side [of the balance] are
the adequacy of the warnings that were provided, and the ability
85. Id. at 1339.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1344.
88. Id. at 1345.
89. See John F. Vargo, Caveat Emptor: Will The A.L.L Erode Strict
Liability In The Restatement (Third) For Products Liability?, 10 ToURo L.
REv. 21 (1993).
90. Vargo, supra note 89, at 29-37.
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of the manufacturer to have provided an alternative warning that
would have prevented the injury.93
Consequently, the court stated, as foreseeability was not an ele-
ment of a strict liability design claim, it was not an element of a
failure to warn claim.94 Applying the balancing test to the evi-
dence before the jury, the court stated that "given the seriousness
of that harm and the slight burden on the manufacturer of provid-
ing a warning, the jury was justified in concluding that baby oil
is a dangerous product that should have been accompanied by an
adequate warning." 95
Just as one swallow does not make a spring, scattered authority
does not support a statement of doctrine. However, in this year of
vigorous review of the bona fides, if any, of strict products li-
ability, I would like the flame kept alive. Claims arising from
potentially toxic products or processes, both established and
novel alike, are in the ascent, and each year new, wide scale in-
juries are proven or hypothesized. 96 In the past year, for exam-
ple, consider the concern over potential long latency harm arising
from proximity to a venerable symbol of industrialization, the
electrical power line.97 Concern has been expressed that geneti-
93. IL
94. Id. Professor Henderson cautions that Ayers on its facts involves the
issue of foreseeability of the manner in which the injury came about, as
distinct from foreseeability or scientific knowability of the type of harm the
product may cause. He states correctly that the risk of a chemical pneumonia
injury from baby oil within the lungs has long been known. Id.
95. Id. at 1346.
96. See Michael D. Green, When Toxic Worlds Collide: Regulatory and
Common Law Prescriptions for Risk Communication, 13 HARV. ENv'rL. L.
REv. 209, 209-10 n.2 (1989) (stating that there was more than a 700%
increase in products liability cases filed between 1974 and 1985). See generally
Jack L. Slobodin, Products Liability Litigation: Litigating the Toxic Tort
Case, C396 ALi-ABA 153, 170-173 (American Law Institute 1989) (discussing
the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A strict liability theory in toxic
product situations and warning of inert ingredients causing the injury).
97. See, e.g., Bill Richards, Elusive Threat: Electric Utilities Brace For
Cancer Lawsuits Though Risk is Unclear, WALL ST. J., Feb. 5, 1993, at A1;
Suit Seeks to Hold Two Utilities Liable for Injuries to Family Living Near
Substation, ToxIcs L. REP. (BNA) No. 31, at 927 (Jan. 8, 1992). However,
only very few cases dealing with tort liability over electric transmission lines
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cally altered plants or livestock, raised for human consumption,
will eventually be shown to cause personal physical injury. 9 8 Re-
quiring the plaintiffs in these and many other long latency toxic
product personal injury claims to prove that the product risks
were known or knowable at the time of initial marketing may
strip the plaintiffs of a claim, even where the proof of proximate
cause is clear. 99 Professor Twerski100 correctly states that, in
general, our tort law does not shift costs unless there is a good
reason to do so. 10 1 I submit that placing into commerce a product
that causes long latency, toxic physical harm, through no fault of
the plaintiff, provides the requisite "good reason" to shift the
costs of injuries.
CONCLUSION
I have not meant to suggest that strategic replacement of strict
liability by adoption of an explicit risk-utility evaluation in cer-
tain products liability areas is not indicated, and you have today
have been litigated. One of these cases was Houston Lighting & Power Co. v.
Klein Indep. Sch. Dist., 739 S.W.2d 508, 511 (Tex. 1987), in which the court
of appeals affirmed the actual damage award by the trial court, but reversed the
punitive damage award for the erection of electrical power lines over school
property.
98. See Thomas 0. McGarity, International Regulation of Deliberate
Release Biotechnologies, 26 TEX. INT'L L.J. 423, 430 (1991) ("Even when
used as designed, technologies can have unanticipated adverse health and
environmental effects .... "); Diane E. Hoffmann, The Biotechnology
Revolution and its Regulatory Evolution, 38 DRAKE L. REV. 471, 472-73
(1989) ("Those who would like to see biotechnology processes and products
more stringently regulated have argued that biotechnology is a new technology
with dangers and risks never before confronted by our society.").
99. See, e.g., Dana K. Astrachan, Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass
Corp.: Asbestos Manufacturers and Strict Liability: Just How Strict is It ?, 23
PAC. L.J. 1807, 1859 (1992) (noting that proof of knowledge or knowability
increases the cost of litigation and consequently discourages toxic injury suits).
100. See Aaron D. Twerski, From A Reporter: A Prospective Agenda, 10
TOURO L. REv. 5 (1993).
101. See Vargo, supra note 89, at 54.
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heard many good reasons for such a reassessment. However, with
regard to certain products, I believe that strict liability ought to
mean what its name suggests, at least the discrete realm of prod-
uct risks I have described. A manufacturer should be held liable
for harm caused to users, consumers and foreseeable bystanders
without regard to what that or other manufacturers knew, or
should have known, about product risks. To repeat, in the finite
categories, that I propose, such a rule retains a manifest fairness.
For products that cause long latency personal physical injuries,
by defective formulation and consequent toxicity by touch,
ingestion, inhalation, infection or radiation, excluding alcohol,
tobacco and prescriptive products, elimination of the state-of-the-
art defense or the state of scientific knowledge defense, and im-
position of true strict tort liability, would preserve the progress of
section 402A where anything less would not adequately protect
injured individuals.
The Reporters and the A.L.I need not endorse this potential
preservation and rarefication of true strict products liability with
regard to these toxic harms. Rather, to permit the common law to
continue to take shape in this finite area, it would be optimal for
the Reporters' notes to state explicitly that the A.L.I takes no
position as to preserving or creating true strict liability for defec-
tive formulation, as to long latency product risks caused by inha-
lation, contact, ingestion, or radiation, excluding alcohol, to-
bacco and prescription products.
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